Ireland is the Global Per Capita Leader for Radical Islamists

Various aspects of national security in Ireland are handled by several different specialist units within the Gardaí including the Emergency Response Unit, the Drugs & Organised Crime Bureau, the Special Detective Unit, Crime & Security Branch as well as G2 Military Intelligence.

However Ireland’s neutrality means that the country does not have the same military and defence budgets, as a percentage of GDP, made available to develop capabilities compared to most other countries.

Irish Intel’s Non-Existent Proactive Track Record

Dubious and bizarre characters of all kinds keep turning up on Irish shores or are in-country having become naturalised Irish citizens or having successfully acquired residency or asylum in Ireland. All of this while involved in various kinds of international military interventions, terrorist fundraising, extremism or as known proponents of radical ideologies.

It would seem that it all falls well below the radar of those who are allegedly overseeing these matters but who assure the Irish public that everything is under control and that there is very little to be concerned about. For instance, after the Paris attacks, the Irish Justice Minister said that “the latest threat assessment to Ireland does not increase… it is low,” and rejected claims that the country’s 9,500 strong Defence Force was inadequately equipped to deal with the terrorist threat. (RTE, November 18, 2015).

This statement betrays the Irish Intel communities blind-spot with respect to Radical Islamism – namely that efforts, if any, are focussed on looking inwards when Ireland has a disproportionate effect on the external activities of Islamic extremists in comparison to the size of its Muslim population.

How can Ireland’s intelligence agencies convince the international community that they are seriously capable of tackling the “jihadi growth industry” in Ireland when spectacular characters such as – Ali-Charaf Damache – The Black Flag or the ISIS recruiter currently resisting deportation or Mahdi al-Harati and his receipt of several million EURO from one of the US alphabet agencies to sponsor rebels in Libya – go completely unnoticed by them until drawn to their attention by externals?

In relation to the Radical Islamist threat we allege that Irish government policy, inertia and ignorance combined with the support and encouragement of ill informed pressure groups, biased refugee support groups and “one size fits all, up for anything” liberals has allowed Ireland to become the soft underbelly for jihadist movement, organisation and support (in particular propagandist social media accounts) in Europe.

Irish Based ISIS Recruiter Fighting Deportation Order 

Mahdi al-Harati (Centre) Irish-Libyan 
Liwaa al-Umma Founder & Alleged US Alphabet Agency Asset 

Three Serious Emerging National Security Threats 

There are three new distinct threats to the Irish State which the Irish State is inadequately equipped to tackle: Islamic Jihadists, Cyber Threats and Espionage.

Cyber Threats and Espionage because of Ireland’s large R&D sector and the massive foreign direct investment Ireland receives while acting as EMEA and in some cases Global HQ’s for many tech and pharmaceutical giants. The Cyber Warfare and Espionage Threats will be the subject of separate blog posts.

There have been arguments that Ireland needs one agency to deal with these three threats alone.

This contrasts sharply with the rhetoric of the Irish government and the downplaying of the threat posed by these newish phenomena in terms of Ireland’s security landscape.

Myriad Weaknesses in Irish Government Policy

In particular, when it comes to tackling Islamic extremism there are myriad weaknesses in the Irish system and the approaches used have not changed much since The Troubles, despite the modern challenges and vastly different methods being used by jihadists.

The Irish government’s assessment is that the Irish security services, despite their small size, have an extremely competent counter-terrorism wing, honed over decades of tackling Irish republican militancy.

The question, however, is to what extent this expertise can now be repurposed towards dealing with militant Islamism, especially given that the threat is rapidly growing and evolving and is culturally, structurally and ideologically at complete odds with what the alleged past experience of the Irish security services has been – from which officialdom in Ireland draws comfort.

Counter Terrorism International (CTI)

Last year the Garda established the Counter Terrorism International (CTI) unit to target groups supporting extremist operations in other countries. The unit it is said works closely with its counterparts throughout the EU, with the CIA, and the National Security Agency in the United States.

Nóirín O’Sullivan is the current Commissioner of the Garda Síochána

Despite this progress, the Irish security services – even this allegedly specialized Islamist-focused unit – face significant resourcing and expertise shortfalls. Irish media recently reported the Gardai lack key counterterrorism tactics such as knowledge of the Arabic-language skills, a dedicated unit tracking jihadist social media and a de-radicalization strategy to rehabilitate returning foreign fighters (Irish Examiner, November 21, 2015).

A source told the Sunday Independent late in 2015 that: “What you have is small groups of jihadis who cannot travel directly to Turkey, for access to Syria, arriving here, receiving support and money and then transiting through Ireland to the war zones. There is quite an elaborate support network based in Dublin and other major Leinster towns which is attracting the attention of security agencies in the rest of Europe and further afield.”

As the above instances demonstrate, Irish jihadists’ alleged use of the country as a logistical and transport hub where false passports can be procured poses potential risks not only to Ireland but also abroad. Uniquely, Irish citizens do not need passports to travel to the UK, and the country is part of the EU and enjoys easy travel to the US under the latter’s visa waiver system. As a result, Islamist radicalization in Ireland does not just pose a threat within Ireland’s borders, but also to countries further afield, and Ireland has failed utterly in its responsibilities in that regard with its laissez-faire attitude to the problem.

That paper also reported that foreign intelligence agencies believe that extremists have been holding training camps in remote areas of Leinster – a province in the East of Ireland.

A Garda spokesperson recently told The Journal Dot IE, that: “In line with best international practice, we seek to promote engagement with communities to counter the threat of radicalisation and devote appropriate resources to investigate individuals who are assessed to pose a threat. A close working relationship is maintained with police and security partners in the EU and other countries in respect of developing threats and ongoing, international efforts to counter terrorism generally. It would be inappropriate, in view of ongoing operations and enquiries, to comment further on specific strategies or methodologies.”

The Islamic Jihadist Threat in Ireland 

Since 2012, it is claimed by official sources that up to 60 Irish citizens have traveled to Syria to fight for a number of different Sunni rebel groups including ISIS. The government in Ireland insisted as recently as January of 2016 that the figure was between 25 and 30. The government of Ireland often states that three of these war zone tourists have been killed. Yet a cursory trawl of records online shows at least five casualties.

  1. Irish citizen, 22-year old Hudhaifa ElSayed, who was of Egyptian origin but raised in Ireland’s County Louth, was killed with Liwaa al-Umma during a clash with Syrian government forces in Idlib province in northern Syria in December 2012 (The Journal, December 20, 2012).
  2. Another individual, 16-year old Shamseddin Gaidan, a Dublin resident of Libyan origin, was killed in Syria in February 2013 fighting with an unknown rebel group, having crossed into the country from Turkey the previous year (Independent [Ireland], February 23, 2013). 
  3. Hisham Habbash (29), a Libyan-born man who grew up in Ireland was been killed during fighting between rebels and regime forces near the northeastern town of Raqqa. (Irish Times, June 24, 2013).
  4. Jordanian-born Palestinian, 22-year old Alaa Ciymeh, who had been brought up in Ireland before returning to Jordan in 2008. He was killed while fighting for the group in April 2013 (Irish Times, May 3, 2013; Herald [Ireland], June 27, 2014).
  5. Muthenna Abu Taubah, 24, an Irish jihadi who defended the beheading of western hostages by IS blew himself up in a bomb-making factory. He died in an accident along with his best friend in the terror group’s self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa, Syria. (The Irish Sun, June 25, 2015)

Although details of Irish involvement in more hardline groups such as the Islamic State or al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate, Jahbat al-Nusra, are scarce, there is evidence that Irish citizens are active with these groups. In August 2014, Irish media reported that a self-described “Irish-Nigerian” convert to Islam had been trying to recruit individuals to come to Syria via the ask.fm internet forum, an approach used by other Islamic State recruiters (Independent, August 21, 2014). In one exchange, the individual – whose online name was “Muthenna ibn Abu” – defended IS’s beheading of British aid worker, David Haines (Independent, September 14, 2014). His identity and current whereabouts are unknown.

TMGCS Counter Theory on Radical Islam in Ireland

Over the course of the last twenty four months TMGCS carried out research that commenced after the publication of our blog post Precision Guided Message (23rd July 2014). The investigation sought to provide a detailed assessment of the actual jihadi culture in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Various methods were used to collect the information that informed the conclusions drawn below including information from sources who participated in relevant events, participation in and observation of certain relevant groups, information from sources in agencies and organisations external to the Irish State, information from sources from the Middle East region living elsewhere in Europe who have been on the ground in Syria, Libya & Iraq, interviews and discussions with associates of known jihadists, observations at a number of student group gatherings as well as input from a number of other methods and OSINT.

The evidence that Ireland, as well as a key exporter of jihadists, is home to a number of Islamic State supporters who are actively providing financial and other forms of support, using the country not only as a recruiting centre, but as a logistical hub is compelling.

The headline outcome of the process is that TMGCS estimate that the actual figure of travelling Irish jihadists is closer to 125 and that, conservatively, there are 20 plus active ISIS supporters providing logistical assistance to that group from within the Irish State.

In November 2015, independent cyber security analysts used leaked details of Islamic State-supporting Twitter accounts to establish that between 20 and 50, active Islamic State online-based supporters were residing in Ireland (The Journal, November 23).

In another indicator of latent support for the Islamic State in Ireland, Irish Muslims responsible for organizing a ‘Not in Our Name’ protest against the terrorist group in July 2015 claimed that they were assaulted by two self-identified Islamic State supporters in an unnamed mosque in Dublin (Irish Times, July 27).

At present, the Irish government is seeking to deport a 52-year old individual (who cannot be named for legal reasons) to a Middle Eastern country (The Journal, December 29). The government has described him as “the foremost organizer and facilitator of travel by extremists prepared to undertake violent action” on behalf of Islamic State in Ireland, and of having also recruited for jihadist groups in Afghanistan (Ibid).

In a potentially related development, in November 2015, citing a security service source, Irish media reported that “a small number of Irish-based Muslim extremists” with a “central group consisting of around 12 radicals” had been sheltering British and European jihadists, including supplying them with fake passports for travel (Irish Independent, November 1, 2015). The source additionally said that Ireland was being used as a stop-off point for jihadists en route to Turkey, in order to confuse security services watching for jihadists travelling to Turkey directly (Ibid).

Excluded Groups

The research process did not include a review or conclusions drawn from the elements of Irish society who are Muslim converts, are non-Muslim or have no direct links to the Middle East but who nonetheless support certain Radical Islamist ideals and groups.

“Taliban Terry” aka Muslim Convert Khalid Kelly

This section of the jihadist infrastructure in Ireland – North and South – mainly draws support from former members or supporters of certain paramilitary organisations, other extremist groups, certain left wing independent politicians, the usual array of the psychologically challenged and a small number of official as well as un-registered “political” parties.

Derry man Eamon Bradley 
Irish fighter in Syrian civil war after arrest in Northern Ireland
and subsequently charged with terror offences
Eamon Bradley in the Middle East with a number of weapons

The Official vs the Unofficial Extremist Per Capita Statistics

At first glance, it would appear that the official and even the increased TMGCS estimates are insignificant compared to other European countries’ jihadist cultures, in particular France and Germany, and minuscule when compared to say active participants in the Syrian conflict from North African countries such as Tunisia and Morocco.

But that is the danger of stand alone numbers versus the value of statistics and analysis.

Countries with relatively small Muslim populations have sent a disproportionately large numbers of jihadis abroad. Finland and Ireland according to reports have the highest number of foreign fighters per capita – nearly one per 1,400 Muslims living in those countries have gone to Syria.

Britain and France have comparable percentages of local Muslims going to fight in Syria – just over one in 6,000 British Muslims and one in 6,666 French Muslims have gone to Syria, governments say. The figures in the Netherlands are not far off, around one in 7,700. American Muslims are going to Syria at a much lower rate, closer to one in 25,000.

CNN recently conducted a study based on data provided by twenty five national governments, from Pew Research Center and a number of other sources. That study concluded that Ireland had the second highest per capita rate of Muslims going to fight in Syria of the twenty five countries surveyed.

Percentage of Local Muslims Who Have Gone to Fight (CNN Study)

The CNN Study put the figure of Irish Jihadists at 0.07% of the overall number of Muslims in Ireland. Out of a Muslim population of around 43,000 only 25 to 30 individuals have gone to fight in Syria according to the information CNN received from the Irish government. Globally, even these incorrect figures still put Ireland in second place in terms of per capita rate of Muslims going to fight in Syria.

  1. Finland: 0.071% – 42,000 Muslims call Finland home. Roughly 30 of them have left to engage in jihadist battles in Syria;
  2. Ireland: 0.070% – Out of a Muslim population of around 43,000, 25 to 30 individuals have gone to fight in Syria according to official Irish government figures; 
  3. France: 0.0175% – Over 700 Muslims have gone from France to fight in Syria out of a population of over four million;
  4. Tunisia: 0.0319% – Out of a population of over 10 million Muslims, there are around 3,000 jihadis;
  5. Indonesia: 0.000370% – A population of over 200 million, has only seen between 30 and 60 Muslims going to fight in the conflict in Syria; 

Ireland Has An Abnormally High Per Capita Rate of Radical Islamists

Ireland is estimated to have a total Muslim population of between 45,000 and 60,000. For the purposes of developing the TMGCS statistics the median figure of 52,500 was chosen.

The result of the CNN study based on government figures was (as outlined above):

Ireland: 0.070% – Out of a Muslim population of around 43,000, 25 to 30 individuals have gone to fight in Syria according to official Irish government figures. Approximating to roughly one in 1400 Irish Muslims;   

The result of the TMGCS study based on the methods we described above is:
Ireland: 0.2761% – Out of a Muslim population of 52,500 (median value), 125 plus individuals have gone to fight in Syria and the radical Islamist process is directly supported by 20 facilitators in Ireland for a total figure of 145. One in every 362 Irish Muslims;     
If the Muslim population estimate of Ireland of 43,000 is used as per the CNN study then the figures are:
Ireland: 0.3372% – Out of a Muslim population of 43,000 (CNN Study Benchmark Figure), 125 plus individuals have gone to fight in Syria and the radical Islamist process is directly supported by 20 facilitators in Ireland for a total figure of 145. One in 297 Irish Muslims;   
Why So Many Radicalized Irish Resident Muslims?
(Excerpted & Referenced from Articles by The Jamestown Foundation)
One potential causes of Irish Muslim radicalization is the range of Islamist groups from the Arab world with strong ideological commitments to “sharia law” and to creating an “Islamic state” that are strongly entrenched in Irish Muslim communities.

These groups have prepared the ground for recruitment and re-inforced the previously slick ISIS propaganda machine while hampering attempts to combat it. Most notably, the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI), based in a mosque in Clonskeagh, Dublin has positioned itself as a representative of all Muslims in Ireland and consequently enjoys privileged access to the Irish government.

This group is closely tied to the hardline European Council for Fatwa and Research, run by Muslim Brotherhood figurehead Yusuf al-Qaradawi, which has sought to promote highly conservative interpretations of Islam to European Muslims.

Even today, ICCI’s website openly offers PDFs of books calling for adulterers to be flogged or stoned to death, thereby directly promoting the same core Islamist ideologies as the Islamic State itself, even while remaining a key partner of the Irish government.

As with other Islamist-influenced organisations in the West, the ICCI has also consistently denied that any radicalization is taking place in Ireland, greatly hampering the attempts to understand domestic radicalization or gain the support of Muslim communities.

For instance, following the November 2015 Paris attacks, the ICCI’s spokesman, Ali Selim, told Irish media that while he condemned the attacks, Irish Muslims “have not been entertaining the ideas [the Islamic State] has been trying to sell them” (RTE, November 14, 2015).

The ICCI has also sought to publicly undermine other Muslim group’s anti-Islamic State protests, for instance, refusing to join an anti-Islamic State march organized by a non-Islamist Sufi Muslim group, further undermining Irish efforts to combat Islamist radicalization (Irish Independent, July 5, 2015).

Irish Government Reaction – Withdrawal of Passports
To counter this issue the most radical action that the Irish government has taken was when it decided last year (2015) that the passports of those involved in illegal jihadi activity in Iraq or Syria would be withdrawn. Pure lip service. 
Additionally, nearly a year earlier when the UK considered introducing similar measures Nick Clegg said it was not obvious how the UK could withdraw passports from British jihadis and remain inside international law. The then deputy prime minister indicated that the idea was unlikely to work, saying that the UK would not do anything illegal. 
The British government had been examining the possibility of withdrawing citizenship from suspected jihadis returning from Iraq and Syria. However, David Cameron acknowledged that there were legal difficulties and omitted it from his package of measures to deal with the problem. 
David Anderson, an independent reviewer of terrorism, said there were significant difficulties with giving police the powers to withdraw passports from UK citizens, in effect leaving them stateless.
In Ireland, we have failed to find any instances of the policy being put into action and the most recent case running through the Irish Courts is ample evidence of the inability of the Irish judiciary to tackle what seems to amount to an open and shut case in terms of an ISIS recruiter operating openly in Dublin, Ireland.  
ISIS Recruiter Fighting Deportation Order 
Before publication we contacted a number of Islamic institutions in Ireland for comment on the findings and assertions in this article and offered them an opportunity to counter our thesis and respond with corrections or suggestions. We received no responses.
References & Sources 

The Jamestown Foundation
James Brandon, Political & Security Risk Analyst
Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 1 January 7, 2016
Global Research & Analysis – EURASIA:Terrorism
Michael Sheils McNamee @michaelonassis michaelsm@thejournal.ie
Michelle Hennessy @michellehtweet michelle@thejournal.ie
The Journal Dot IE
Vocativ
Die Welt
France 24
El Mundo
VICE News
RT.com
The Syrian Human Rights Observatory
The Irish Times
The Foreign Policy Institute
War on the Rocks Blog
The Long War Journal
The Irish Sun
The Independent
The Guardian
The Daily Mail

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A Beginner’s Guide to being a German Politician

This beginners guide to being a German politician draws from the legacy of Bismarck in 1871 to Merkel in 2015 with star turns by the Kaiser and Hitler in between and a cameo by Willy Brandt in the late 1960’s.
There are only five very simple rules: 
1. Make a very bad decision that undermines your country and Europe and sometimes the world; 
2. Stick rigidly to this decision despite overwhelming evidence of its disastrous consequences (this is known as “Teutonic Arrogance Regression Syndrome” in psychiatric circles and is a cyclical dormant condition that can never be fully cured and re-appears now and again despite everyones best efforts but always looks a little different – a little bit like herpes);
3. Fail spectacularly in what you were trying to achieve and destroy your country in the process and a few neighbouring ones too; 
4. Perform a huge u-turn, mumble something about “orders” or “best intentions” or that “you were on holidays at the time you did not do it” or better still blame someone else for the decision and patch up your error with money, hand-wringing and sincere promises that you will not do it again; 
5. Do it again; 
For a practical example of the application of these rules please read “Merkel wants to ‘drastically decrease’ refugee arrivals in Germany

The Usual Mechanics of an Obama Speech

Case Study: Address to the UN General Assembly (09.28.2015)

Main Take Outs & Speech Summary 

Blah, blah, blah …. incorrect reference to historical precedent …. blah, blah …. sincere look …. blah …. fake empathy …. blah, blah, blah …. backslap and high five for fellow ultra-liberals (Choose Merkel or Pope Francis) …. blah blah blah …. dramatic pause …. blah …. knowing stare into the middle distance …. blah blah …. lots more words with no substance …. blah blah blah …. minorities matter, majorities must comply …. blah blah ….

Say more words that translate to weakness pretending to be strength …. blah, blah, blah …. more words that loosely mean more inaction disguised as diplomacy …. blah, blah …. make appeal to irrelevant emotions – your kids, my kids, the future …. blah, blah, blah …. some more vague general piffle …. blah, blah ….

Quote the US Constitution which you have rode rough shod over since 2008 (Choose creating own laws without due process using the Supreme Court, number of executive orders issued in last seven years, lack of consultation with Congress the alleged voice of the people) …. blah, blah ….

Make some more vague generalisations and non-specific argument …. blah blah blah …. point a finger (choose Israel, Syria or Russia in order of indifference to their respective motivations)…. blah, blah …. speak of friends and partners (choose Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Qatar) …. blah, blah, blah …. offer inappropriate comparison between problems resolved in Senegal, Singapore and Colombia and those of the current global war on terror specifically Syria and Iraq …. blah, blah ….

The end … cue lack lustre applause and eye rolling by the audience and a look of satisfaction and utter accomplishment from Mr. President …. meanwhile nothing changes for the better in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kurdistan, Ukraine, Crimea, the refugees crisis, the rest of the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans while race relations, illegal immigration and the deficit have all reached “basket case” scenarios in the USA.

Rebuttal to Comment on the LinkedIn Forum: Counter Terrorism & Geopolitical Security

Rebuttal to Comment made by NAME WITHHELD on the Counter Terrorism & Geopolitical Security Forum on LinkedIn regarding TMG Corporate Services’ blog post Schengen: Compromising Europe’s internal security by “democratic consent” Authors: Graham Penrose, Owner, TMG Corporate Services & Mr. Douglas Straun, Senior Risk Analyst & Defence Consultant  
Thank you Sir for your opinion and comments – please allow me to address them in the order in which they are made and to also rebut the conclusion which you have arrived at. 
Before doing so I would like to state that I find your commentary offensive – as it does not attempt to debate the issue but offers sweeping unsubstantiated generalisations, introduces emotion, concludes with an insult and in its entirety calls into question my integrity and that of my team: 
1. Your comment in quotes: “This is really an unqualified opinion based on simple assumptions. The results in my opinion are inaccurate.” 
Our Response: In the first instance this is a blog post and as stated in the body of the post is one of a series of posts to follow – each subsequent post elaborating and extrapolating on the statements made in the current post and offering evidence to prove the veracity of what we have written. It is not nor does it purport to be an academic treatise drawing the premise from introduction through all stages of proof with references ending in a comprehensive set of findings and conclusions – that is because – as we clearly stated within the body of the post (which I am not sure that you actually read in full based on your comments):
How much more destructive, effective and demoralising will these new attacks be when executed by seasoned extremists, tested fighters and ideologues who are natives of the regions in question sent directly from the heart of the conflict in Syria & Iraq, who have likely seen family and friends die during the recent conflicts and who have been tutored personally by the extremist leadership of these organisations? As opposed to first or second generation Western European radical Islamists who learned their trade by distance education, short visits to training camps and likely had no personal tragedies to call upon to escalate and motivate their actions and extremism in the name of Radical Islam. A bold claim – the evidence for which TMG Corporate Services holds and will publish in a series of blog posts over the coming weeks and months including names, locations, former affiliations, current affiliations, current aliases and likely objectives.
2. Your comment in quotes: “Remember any conclusion depends on the validity of the evidence. In this case we are establishing if groups of terrorists are infiltrating into Europe hidden among refugees. The purpose of these terrorists is to establish sleeper networks and prepare for armed attacks. As there is no evidence to support this we have to evaluate if it is possible and as easy as it seems.” 
Our Response: See (1) above and also please be aware that we are not in the business of conducting amateurish analysis and therefore I can assure you that this introductory post is a “scene setter” for the evidence, which we possess, to validate the assertions that we are making. This evidence is not Google search based desk jockey academic theory but field based and first hand experience combined with accounts from eye witnesses and parties to the planning of this process which we discuss in our post.
3. Your comment in quotes: “As there is no factual data we have to judge whether these assumption are reasonable. The first consideration is will the genuine refugees protect the identity of any terrorists or foreign fighter. Remember these refugees are not unknown individuals. They are made up of families and friends from the same region. In most cases all running from ISIS. The majority will be in non-combatant professions or academics. Will they jeopardise there safety for a terrorist?” 
Our Response: We cannot allow you to make the allegations that you have made about our lack of evidence and then not challenge you on this statement especially “The majority will be in non-combatant professions or academics.” On what basis do you come to this conclusion? 
It is our experience that you are incorrect. With respect to the rest of the content of this section of your argument I would offer you the following links relating to a recent high profile incident involving an alleged legitimate “refugee” to refute your belief that those travelling with extremists are all aware of each others previous history and affiliations in-country – please see https://www.rt.com/news/316124-refugee-camerawoman-kicked-militant/ and http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/200921#.VgIGn2Ttmko and http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/20092015 . 
The assertions that you make in this section of your comment – even in the absence of the example in the links above – would leave even a credulous individual having difficulty accepting that extremists travelling in the company of genuine refugees would be as easily identifiable as you claim. 
It is akin to claiming that a bank clerk from North London would instantly recognise an Islamic extremist from South London while travelling on the same tube in the underground. Really? – you feel that the identity of every radicalised Islamist is known by all and sundry in their company? 
Additionally, a cursory glance at the make up of the refugee groups in Macedonia, Croatia and Hungary – not the images you view on TV which concentrate on women and young children – but the views we have seen on the ground show large groups of unaccompanied men travelling in hoodies and face masks and not family units as you assert. This is in part evidenced in the videos we embedded within our post.  
4. Your comment in quotes: “Next- when refugees enter a country they undergo a structured examination to asses credibility. The primary investigation includes interview’s by academic experts, country ands language analysts, security and religious experts mainly from the claimants country of origin. In effect they undergo a security assessment, which under current policies a person with any discrepancies can be detained indefinitely. If accepted they are effectively on parole with weekly visits and are monitored. So can a foreign fighter claim to be Syrian pass these interviews?” 
Our Response: This Sir is entirely inaccurate – even a novice observer of recent events is aware that the Italians ceased six months ago to register rescued migrants from boating disasters in the Mediterranean and rather – because of a lack of assistance from their EU colleagues – unilaterally decides to allow the rescued migrants to choose their reception country and register at time of entry with the authorities there. 
At least there was a modicum of traceability surrounding that process. However – migrants and refugees are currently passing unregistered and unidentified from Serbia and Croatia in to the EU and onwards. 
Are you seriously suggesting that any sleeper / infiltrator is then going to proceed directly to a registration point and submit themselves to the processes you describe. If they even existed, which they do not in the form you describe, the backlog would mean lengthy delays in processing. 
And are the migrants being held in secure camps on arrival in the EU in the country of their choice – no they are not Sir. Therefore I submit to you that this section of your argument is nonsensical notwithstanding the fact that within the current chaos any sleeper / infiltrator – even the most inexperienced – would have little difficulty avoiding detection and moving through Europe at will and undetected or even identified. 
5. Your comment in quotes: “The next assumption is there is a terrorist reception infrastructure? Also safe houses with secure communications, arms and equipment waiting for these terrorists. ????? The more we drill down we tend to see this article is guesswork resulting in scaremongering.” 
Our Response: Guesswork? – your entire comment is a series of fictional statements. Yes, there is a “terrorist reception infrastructure” to coin your phrase and it does provide accommodation, logistical support, planning capabilities and a supply of weaponry. 
With respect to the secure communications – why don’t you google some of these keywords below and educate yourself regarding how advanced those comms capabilities are and have been for quite some time now and which have evolved significantly – in terms of eavesdropping counter measures and engineered backdoor detection – since the revelations by traitorous Snowden and Assange. Google the following:  
1. Al-Fajr Technical Committee 
2. Al-Fajr Android App For Secure Communication
3. Al-Fajr Announces New Website 
4. Al-Qaeda’s Embrace Of Encryption Technology 
5. The Impact Of Edward Snowden on Terrorist Comms Tech
6. The Cyber & Jihad Lab – Presented by MEMRI
7. Inspire Asrar Instructions
8. How Al-Qaeda Uses Encryption Post-Snowden (Part 1)
9. How Al-Qaeda Uses Encryption Post-Snowden (Part 2)
To conclude – the “scaremongering” that you accuse us of is clearly based on an ill thought out set of assumptions and yours are the words of a naive and inexperienced individual regarding these matters. 
Your veneer thin assessment of our post and your knowledge of current jihadi affairs and strategy is the type of misguided and uninformed mindset that will allow these people to succeed in their objectives if there were not others more qualified than you taking the required actions.  
I will leave you with a quote from Charles Bukowski – “The problem with the world is that the intelligent people are full of doubts, while the stupid ones are full of confidence.” 

Schengen: Compromising Europe’s internal security by "democratic consent"

Co-Author: Mr. Douglas Straun, Senior Risk Analyst & Defence Consultant

FRANCE – The Southern European states are now in total collapse and helpless to stop the daily flood of “refugees” – estimates say that there are 635,000 “refugees” waiting along the Turkish coast to cross to Greece. 

Ignorance is Bliss – Self Delusion is the order of the day

23,700 arrived in Austria this week of which 78 % were male and an estimated 83% of those males were under the age of 30 – the series of videos on this page shows the skewed media reporting of this phenomenon:

Video #1: Shows the aggression of the male “refugees” at Röszke; 

Video #2: Shows Hungarian SF firing water-cannon & tear gas at “refugees” as if to say that it was an unprovoked act against women & children as reported by the misleading media segments that lack the proper context or frame of reference; 
Video #3: Shows the predominantly fit young male demographic of the overwhelming majority of these “refugees”;

There are likely many ISIS members / sympathisers hiding in plain sight here – their actions in these videos show they are fit and aggressive enough to be able to direct their energies against the enemy in their own nation – a passion to enter Europe not matched by a passion to liberate their own country from tyranny or assist their women and children to leave with them. 

The Need for a Unified Refugee Policy & Rigour in Registration & Deportation

Proper screening of these “refugees” is essential – lax German & Swedish policies are encouraging these activities and are planting the seeds of future mayhem in Europe. 


The deserving and legitimate refugees need to be protected, cared for, housed, integrated and healed – those who do not fall into that category must be immediately deported to put an end to this socially engineered migration encouraged by a rampant “one size fits all” attitude to the phenomenon being peddled by the liberal and naive in Western Europe. 


A Unified Policy Response is Unlikely

There is no possibility – based on the inaction of the EU, NATO, UN and the USA in Libya, Syria and Iraq over the last twenty four months – of any cohesive and unified policy emerging. The nations on the front line of the problem cannot cope and the hand wringing, chin trembling nations who were the root cause of the current conflagrations from North West Africa to the borders of India stand idly by and watch while their open borders ideal goes to hell under the feet of countless economic migrants, welfare opportunists, some political asylum seekers and some genuine refugees. 

Building a Sleeper Army by Social Media – Phase 1 (2013 / 2014) 

In our blog post Precision Guided Message – Radical Islam, Social Media, and Building a Sleeper “Army” of the 23rd July 2014 we addressed Phase 1 of the ISIS sleeper cell radicalisation and recruitment strategy: 

With a reported 2500 Western fighters (Grose, 2014), IS’s efforts would appear to be a success, but how influential was the use of social media and what are they doing differently? Additionally, are “boots on the ground” the only indicator of success. We do not believe so. A more threatening and undermining effect of this strategy is the construction of a sleeper network and the manipulation of international cells whom IS never intend to draw to the actual conflict zones.

To solely focus on the immediate effect in terms of IS fighting numbers in the field and to encourage this social media activity so that Western intelligence agencies can locate activists or anticipate operations in the short term is one dimensional and ignores the more worrying mid to long term effects and possible strategic intentions of IS.

Additionally we commented that: 

One of the contributing factors in the forward momentum of the Islamic State (IS) [formerly and variously the Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State of Iraq & al-Sham; and the Islamic State of Iraq & the Levant (ISIL)] is the rapid and regimented dissemination of the organization’s message.

At the time of writing of that blog post there were as stated above an estimated 2500 foreign fighters active for ISIS in the Syrian conflict – by October 2014 (a mere four months later) this had risen to an estimated 16,500.  


Similarly since then the incidence of lone wolf attacks by radicalised Islamists in Europe has grown exponentially since 2014: the Charlie Hebdo massacre, the brutal murder of Drummer Lee Rigby (2nd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers), the ‎Thalys Arras Train Incident, The Porte de Vincennes siege, the attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium, the Krudttønden Cultural Centre attack in Copenhagen it is clear that the long distance radicalisation tactics had been effective.     

In conclusion we had stated:

This analysis considers IS’s basic use of two social media tools through June/July 2014. When al-Qaeda used online tools for recruitment, a thorough tactical analysis with in-depth assessments about the organization’s success was not possible until almost a decade after recruitment began (Gerwehr & Daly, 2005). It is likely that in-depth research about IS’s success or failure to use social media may take a comparable amount of time. However, since IS has succeeded in recruiting more Westerners than any other group to date, it is imperative to begin the process now. We recommend analysis of accounts which are providing the highest level of audience segment targeting toward Western audiences, including analyzing names chosen for such accounts and their use of idioms and slogans, with particular attention to evidence of positive Western response and IS’s ability to capitalize on success, to predict threats and develop countermeasures. Other avenues for analysis are currently being developed and results and findings will take the form of further posts on our various publishing platforms.

Building a Sleeper Army by Covert Migration – Phase 2 (2015) 

Meanwhile, as part of the current migration crisis Islamic State, Al Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda terrorists are gleefully and freely executing the building of a large scale sleeper network throughout Western Europe.

How much more destructive, effective and demoralising will these new attacks be when executed by seasoned extremists, tested fighters and ideologues who are natives of the regions in question sent directly from the heart of the conflict in Syria & Iraq, who have likely seen family and friends die during the recent conflicts and who have been tutored personally by the extremist leadership of these organisations? As opposed to first or second generation Western European radical Islamists who learned their trade by distance education, short visits to training camps and likely had no personal tragedies to call upon to escalate and motivate their actions and extremism in the name of Radical Islam.  

A bold claim – the evidence for which TMG Corporate Services holds and will publish in a series of blog posts over the coming weeks and months including names, locations, former affiliations, current affiliations, current aliases and likely objectives.

A phenomenon borne out by The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the work of Harleen Gambhir and her team who conducted simulation exercises on February 27 and March 16, 2015 to discover the diplomatic and military opportunities and pitfalls likely to arise in the coming months of the counter-ISIS fight. 

Several developments that ISW predicted during the simulation have already occurred. Identifying these scenarios and opportunities in advance they believe can enable the US and its allies to make better-informed decisions in the long-term.

ISIS – Three Simultaneous Well Orchestrated Campaigns

They have also focussed on how ISIS is executing their global strategy and they categorise this ISIS strategy as having three simultaneous campaigns:

1. Defending its existing territory in Syria & Iraq;   
2. Working with regional affiliates to “foster disorder in the near abroad” – the Middle East and North Africa; and 
3. Launching terror campaigns focussed on the “far abroad” to include the West, Australia and South East Asia;  

The current infiltration of Western Europe under the guise of “refugee” status is an element of the “far abroad” element of the three pointed strategy being pursued by the group.

Understanding the Inaction by the EU  

All the while Brussels and its legion of liberal misguided bureaucrats stubbornly cling to the Schengen concept that is woefully inadequate and for which they never legislated would result in current events and who are now unwilling to accept responsibility for this, let alone amend Schengen for fear of compromising the precious Euro.

We are witnessing the invasion of Europe and the compromising of its internal security by “democratic consent”. Federal Europe and its bureaucratic structures, liberal mindset, lack of martial spirit and slavish adherence to political correctness is the greatest weapon that the Islamic State possess and it is exploiting that weakness to maximum effect at present.