The Iranians are realizing the dream of a reborn Persian Empire

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Iran is an empire once again at last, and its capital is Baghdad”
Ali Younesi, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Special Assistant on Ethnic and Religious Minorities Affairs

The eastern and southern regions of Iraq, with majority Shia populations, has always tended to fall within the orbit of Iran’s influence. During the Iran-Iraq war – 1980 to 1988 – Iran funded Shiite militias with the aim of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s government.
The two countries ultimately ground each other into a stalemate but after the US invasion and subsequent withdrawal from Iraq, Iran’s ability to project power into Iraq has only grown exponentially to the point where they are the predominant force influencing internal affairs in Iraq (2015).
Following the Islamic State group’s blitz through Iraq and march toward Baghdad, Iranian-funded Shiite militias were remobilized. The most powerful of them was the Badr Organization, an Iranian-backed political and military organization that has carried out revenge attacks against Sunnis throughout Iraq.

Rampaging Shiite Militias Inflame the Sectarian Divide
The Khorasani Brigade is just one of dozens of similar militias that are essentially running their own show in parts of the country. These Shiite militias are supplied with weapons and equipment from the central government in Baghdad, which is now being assisted by a U.S.-led military alliance in its fight against the Islamic State.
There is mounting evidence that Iraq’s Shiite militias are using the fight against the Islamic State as cover for a campaign of sectarian violence targeting Sunni Arab communities.
The Baghdad authorities have turned a blind eye to these militias’ crimes, while foreign governments have ignored the militias’ use of their military aid to pursue their campaign against Sunni Arabs.

That became an issue for the US, because such sectarian militias, generally loyal to Iran, killed and maimed hundreds of American troops during the Iraq war.
“It’s a little hard for us to be allied on the battlefield with groups of individuals who are unrepentantly covered in American blood,” Ryan Crocker, a career diplomat who served as the US ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, told US News.
More recently the so-called Special Groups have played a pivotal role in halting the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, after the Iraqi Army disintegrated.
“Iran and its Iraqi proxies have been carving out a zone of influence in eastern Iraq for well over a decade,” writes Michael Knights, a fellow at the Washington Institute. “And this zone, as [US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey] noted, is expanding.”
Qassem Suleimani & Iran’s QUDS Force
Iran’s military mastermind, Qassem Suleimani, has played pivotal roles in the deployment of Iranian assets against ISIS in Iraq. Suleimani was present during the successful siege of Amerli in August 2014, and he is on the frontlines of the battle against ISIS in Tikrit.
Suleimani is the head of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, putting him in charge of directing Iranian proxies throughout the Middle East. 


His constant presence in various frontline battles serves to underscore the propaganda of an ascendant Iran with its forces battling for control throughout the region.
The Battle for Tikrit
Tikrit is under siege by a coalition of Iranian-backed Shiite militias and Iraqi army forces. The offensive is being overseen by Suleimani. 
Should the forces liberate Tikrit from ISIS, Iran will have scored a significant propaganda win.

The seizure will place Iranian-backed forces on the road to ISIS-controlled Mosul, Iraq’s second-biggest city, and humiliate Sunnis by having Iran take control of Saddam Hussein’s hometown.
Furthermore, the US has to sit back and watch. The image below by Ahmad Al-Rubaye shows Iraqi Shiite militia fighters after pushing back ISIS militants on September 3, 2014 on the road between Amerli and Tikrit in Iraq.

US Attitude to Suleimani & Iraq
“There’s just no way that the US military can actively support an offensive led by Suleimani”  says Christopher Harmer, a former aviator in the United States Navy in the Persian Gulf. 
Harmer, who is now an analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, also told Helene Cooper of The New York Times that Suleimani is  “a more stately version of Osama bin Laden.”
To assist in the siege of Tikrit and further military operations against ISIS, Iran has moved advanced rockets and artillery systems into Iraq, The New York Times reports.
These systems have introduced a new level of sophistication into the Iraqi warzone and could further inflame sectarian tensions as the artillery is often imprecise and has the potential to cause collateral damage.
“The Fajr-5 rocket and Fateh-110 missile launching systems are typically carried on a specially designed truck and are formidable additions to the Iraqi arsenal,” The Times notes. “Fajr-5 rockets, which are named after the Persian word for dawn, have a range of about 45 miles. Each is 20 feet long and weighs more than 2,000 pounds. The Fajr-5 warhead alone weighs 375 pounds … The Fateh-110 missile is even more capable than the Fajr-5.”
In November 2014, Iranian pilots bombed ISIS positions in Diyala, a religiously mixed Iraqi province that abuts Iran.
The presence of Iranian planes conducting airstrikes at the same time and in the same region as US military operations showed at least a deconfliction between the two countries’ militaries. (The same thing is happening in Syria.)
‘Export the Revolution’
Iran’s ambitions go far beyond Iraq and are taking them increasingly closer to the borders of the country’s regional adversaries.
Last month, Suleimani gloated: “We are witnessing the export of the Islamic Revolution throughout the region. From Bahrain and Iraq to Syria, Yemen and North Africa.”
Tony Badran, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explains what Iran’s military mastermind means by this: “When he talks about exporting the Islamic Revolution, Suleimani is referring to a very specific template. It’s the template that the Khomeinist revolutionaries first set up in Lebanon 36 years ago by cloning the various instruments that were burgeoning in Iran as the Islamic revolutionary regime consolidated its power.
“As a result, Hezbollah remains the most comprehensive and developed export of the Iranian model … Now the Islamic revolutionary model is being reproduced in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen as well, by setting up those same structures.”
That is why Ali Khedery, who served as a special assistant to five US ambassadors and as a senior adviser to three heads of US Central Command between 2003 and 2009, told The New York Times in December that Suleimani was “the leader of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen,” adding that “Iraq is not sovereign. It is led by Suleimani, and his boss,” Iranian Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.”
Acknowledgements & References
  1. Michael Knights, Fellow at the Washington Institute
  2. Ralph Lengler, Experience Consultant, https://www.quora.com/Ralph-Lengler
  3. The Foreign Policy Group
  4. Al Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East
  5. Ali Mamouri, Columnist, Al-Monitor’s Iraq Pulse
  6. Shahir ShahidSaless, Political Analyst and Freelance Journalist
  7. Dmitri Rybak, TMG Corporate Services
  8. Charles Davis, intelography.com
  9. Business Insider
  10. Associated Press
  11. Reuters
  12. Getty Images
  13. Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP/Getty Images
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Iran as a planner and supporter of global terror

Since the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the government of Iran has been accused by members of the international community for funding, providing equipment, weapons, training and giving sanctuary to terrorists. The United States State Department describes Iran as an “active state sponsor of terrorism.”US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice elaborated stating, “Iran has been the country that has been in many ways a kind of central banker for terrorism in important regions like Lebanon through Hezbollah in the Middle East, in the Palestinian Territories, and we have deep concerns about what Iran is doing in the south of Iraq. 
World attention on Iran centers on the threats to international security posed by the country’s nuclear program. As Iran persistent to become a nuclear power, the regime in Tehran also employs an aggressive foreign policy that relies heavily on the deployment of clandestine assets abroad to collect intelligence and support foreign operations. The world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism, Tehran relies on terrorism to further Iranian foreign policy interests. Today, Iran feels itself under increasing pressure from the international community by both diplomatic and economic sanctions.
From the Stunt virus to the assassination of Iranian scientists and the defection of Iranian agents, Iran feels increasingly targeted by Western intelligence services in general and Israel and the United States in particular. Hezbollah and Iran each have their own reasons for executing terrorist attacks targeting Israeli or other Western targets. Iran seeks to avenge attacks on its scientists and sanctions targeting its nuclear program, and Hezbollah seeks to avenge Mughniyeh’s death. This convergence of interests strengthens their long-standing and intimate relationship, making their combined operational capabilities that much more dangerous.
In the past, major acts of Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism have ultimately been linked back to the most senior elements of the Iranian leadership. When such cases have led to major law enforcement investigations and prosecutions, the links have been made public. For example, in June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex that was home to American, Saudi, French, and British service members in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province—the last time Iranian agents carried out an attack targeting both U.S. and Saudi interests. In that case, Iranian agents teamed up with Saudi and Lebanese Hezbollah operatives to carry out the attack. According to the testimony of a former CIA official, arrangements for the Khobar Towers attack began around 1994, including planning meetings likely held in Tehran and operational meetings held at the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria. It was in 1994, according to this account, that the criminal Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khomeini, gave the order for the attack on the Khobar Towers complex.


In April 2008, Gen. David Petraeus testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the flow of sophisticated Iranian arms to Shia militants in Iraq. The military’s understanding of Iran’s support for such groups crystallized, Petraeus explained, with the capture of a number of prominent Shia militants and several members of the Qods Force operating in Iraq as well. In case it was not already clear to General Petraeus that Qods Force Chief Gen. Qasem Soleimani was calling the shots for Iran in Iraq, the head of the Qods Force reportedly sent the commander of coalition forces a message in early 2008 to make the point. Conveyed by a senior Iraqi leader, the message came just as Iraqi and coalition forces initiated Operation Charge of the Knights, a concerted effort to target Iraqi Shia militias in Baghdad and Basra. Iran’s use of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, however, goes back as far as the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Writing in 1986, the CIA assessment which is now de-classified report titled “Iranian Support for International Terrorism” that while Iran’s support for terrorism was meant to further its national interest, it also stemmed from the clerical regime’s perception “that it has a religious duty to export its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means, a constant struggle against the perceived oppressor states. According to CIA reporting in the late 1980s, “Iranian leaders view terrorism as an important instrument of foreign policy that they use both to advance national goals and to export the regime’s Islamic revolutionary ideals. Tehran’s capability to carry out global terror attacks rests on its ability to call upon a group of Middle East–based terror groups willing to act at Iran’s behest, a network that would almost certainly be called upon to execute the kind of asymmetric terror attacks that can be carried out with reasonable deniability and therefore make a targeted response more difficult.

Muhammad Hejazi, the deputy head of Iran’s armed forces, hinted that Tehran could order proxy militant groups in Gaza and Lebanon to fire rockets into Israel. He even implied such a strike could be used preemptively, before an attack on Iran. “We are no longer willing to wait for enemy action to be launched against us,” he told Iran’s Fars News Agency. “Our strategy now is that we will make use of all means to protect our national interests.”16 Hezbollah leaders have also stated they would stand by Iran and any other entity that has stood up to the “Zionist regime.

Of all the terrorist groups that Tehran has sponsored over the past twenty-eight years, none is more important to Iran than Hezbollah. Iran helped to create Hezbollah in the early 1980s, funding, training, and indoctrinating new members of the fledgling movement. This support created a completely loyal proxy group ready to engage in terrorist activities at Iran’s behest. As one senior Hezbollah official noted in the early 1980s, “Our relation with the Islamic revolution is one of a junior to a senior of a soldier to his commander.
In Africa, where Hezbollah’s support networks are well entrenched, the group need not rely on Iranian operational support as much as it does elsewhere. It is said that said, the sponsor and its proxy do cooperate closely on two key agenda in Africa: proselytizing and recruitment, and arms smuggling. Committed to its constitutional directive to export the Islamic Revolution, the Revolutionary Guard proactively recruits Shia in Africa by the efforts of Iranian and Lebanese missionaries proselytizing across the continent. As early as 1985, the CIA was aware that Iran had long been known to “promote subversive activity” in far-flung countries with Shia populations, including Nigeria. Three years later, a CIA report acknowledged the phenomenon was far more widespread than just in Nigeria. Moreover, the agency highlighted Hezbollah’s participation in efforts to spread Iran’s Islamic revolutionary vision in Africa.


Iraqi Shia extremists feature prominently in Iran’s arsenal of regional proxies. On their own, and in cooperation with the Qods Force, local Hezbollah affiliates and groups like the Iraqi Dawa Party have engaged in terrorism and political violence in support of their own and Iranian interests. In time, evidence of Hezbollah’s presence in Iraq would be plentiful. Indeed, Hezbollah would create an outfit, Unit 3800, dedicated to aiding the Shia insurgency in Iraq. Iraq became a core issue for Hezbollah, however, not because it had anything to do with Lebanon but because gaining influence over Iraq and hegemony in the region is of primary concern to its Iranian sponsors. Of course, Iran has long sought to push the United States out of the Gulf region. “Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the greatest threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in the Middle East.” So read the opening statement of a CIA memo written in mid-February 1985 on terrorism in the Middle East. So it was that Hezbollah, at Iran’s behest, helped develop a sophisticated training program for Shia militants from Iraq. Some training occurred in Iraq, reportedly at the Deir and Kutaiban camps east of Basra near the Iranian border. In Iran, Hezbollah and Qods Force instructors ran a well-organized training program in which Daqduq was directly involved, “helping Qods Force in training Iraqis inside Iran.”

Over time, Hezbollah operatives trained enough Iraqi Shia militants—in Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon—to significantly improve the Special Groups’ paramilitary capabilities. Hezbollah provided the Iraqi insurgents “with the training, tactics and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations, and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices, incorporating lessons learned from operations in Southern Lebanon,” according to an April 2010 Pentagon report. Indeed, it would not take long before Hezbollah operatives would begin directing Iraqi militants in the execution of exactly such operations.
Also Washington reported in The Jerusalem Post that : Iran continues to arm and finance a terrorist network that extends from South Asia to the Horn of Africa, from Iraq to Yemen, and across the Palestinian territories, the US State Department reported on Wednesday, acknowledging US willingness to nevertheless engage directly in talks with the state over its nuclear program. Much of the report, released annually by the State Department to outline threats of terrorism around the world, focuses on Iran’s expansive efforts to fund and funnel arms to Islamist organizations, including Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon but operates worldwide.“Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups,” the report details, “although Hamas’s ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war.” In its efforts to bolster Hezbollah, Iran considers Syria “a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route” and has taken an active role in supporting embattled Syrian President Bashar Assad, the US report claims.
Consider that Iran’s intelligence penetration of South America has expanded significantly since the AMIA bombing. Testifying before Congress in the weeks following that 1994 attack, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism expressed concern that Iranian embassies in the region were stacked with larger than necessary numbers of diplomats, some of whom were believed to be intelligence agents and terrorist operatives:“We are sharing information in our possession with other States about Iranian diplomats, Iranian terrorist leaders who are posing as diplomats, so that nations will refuse to give them accreditation, or if they are already accredited, to expel them. We have had some success in that respect, but we have not always succeeded.

Acknowledgements: Akam Assadi